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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RFJX T. FUHRIMAN, INC., 
) Plaintitff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 10925 
.JOHN E. JARRELL, \ 
Defendant and Respondent. } 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a civil action brought by Plaintiff to recover 
for rent of a house, with a Counterclaim by the Defendant 
for damages for breach of a construction contract be-
tween the parties. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Court, sitting without a jury, gave judgment to 
the Plaintiff on its Complaint for the rentals and judg-
ment to the Defendant for his Counterclaim for damages 
for breach of contract. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of that part of 
the judgment in Defendant's favor for damages for 
breach of contract. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is a building contractor corporation and 
the principal constructor of homes in what is known as 
the "Golf Course Subdivision" in Logan, Utah, having 
built about one-half of the new homes in this area. (Tr. 
120) 
Defendant desired to build a new home in this area 
and engaged Plaintiff to do the job. (Ex. 4 and 5) In 
the meantime, Defendant needed a home in which to 
reside and entered into a lease arrangement with Plain-
tiff to occupy one of Plaintiff's completed homes in said 
area. (Tr. 6, 8, 51, and 52) 
The address of the rental home is 1454 North 16th 
East, Logan, Utah. The Complaint involves this home. 
The address of the constructed home is 1675 East 
14th North, Logan, Utah. The Counterclaim involves 
this home. 
Defendant occupied the rental home from Septem-
ber 9, 1964 to April 5, 1965 (when the constructed home 
was finished) at an agreed rental of $125.00 per month, 
a total of seven months less four days, or a total rental 
of $858.36. (Tr. 6, 8, 51, 52, and 102) 
Following the completion of the constructed home, 
Plaintiff submitted a billing to the Defendant, Exhibit 
Def. 1, showing rent due on the rented house and the 
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balance due on the constructed house, summarizing 
both charges and credits. 
On May 12, 1965, Defendant sent Plaintiff two 
checks: 
(a) Exhibit Def. 2 for $138.36 marked "Rent (1454 
North 16th East) less interest on house money." (Tr. 
~6 and Exhibit Def. 2) 
( b) Exhibit Pl. 1, for $3,920.10 marked "In full 
payment on my home 1675 East 14th North, Logan, 
Utah." err. 82 and Exhibit Pl. 1) 
Plaintiff returned the rent check as unacceptable 
and accepted and cashed the home check as payment on 
the home. Plaintiff made further demand on the rent 
due and, receiving no payment, filed suit in City Court. 
Defendant originally filed only an Answer and did 
not file a Counterclaim until after trial and over Plain-
tiff's objection in City Court. (R. 5) The Counterclaim 
exceeded City Court .iurisdiction and threw the matter 
into District Court, where a second trial was had re-
sulting in the .iudgment appealed from. 
As to the constructed home, water came into the 
basement, some through a cement wall where tie rods 
penetrated the wall and some through a window well. 
( 'l1r. 62, 128, and 134) 
The language of the specifications here involved~ 
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EXhibit 5, reads: ''Waterproofing: asphalt emulsion.'' 
To comply with this, Plaintiff applied a thick asphalt 
emulsion about the size of a baseball at each plaoe in the 
foundation where a tie rod penetrated through the foun-
dation. (Tr. 63, 124, 125, and 152) 
Th~ Court, in its Memotandum Opinion, ruled that 
the above phrase menat ''one coat of emulsion to be 
sprayed or painted on the 0utside of the walls to the 
basement." (R. 11) 
When Plaintiff was advised of the leaks in the 
basement, the source of the leaks were plugged effect-
ively. ( R. 11, Memorandum Opinion) The Court then 
held that, even though the patchwork was effective, the 
market value of the dwelling was materially diminished 
to the extent of $1200.00, for which amount Defendant 
was awarded judgment. (Plus $100.00 for a defect in 
linoleum, hereinafter discussed.) The Court, in arriv-
ing at the figure $1200.00, determined the record was 
void as to evidence on this point of market value but 
adopted in this respect a figure given by the one witness 
called hy Defendant on this point that to dig up around 
the foundation and apply two coats of asphalt emulsion 
would cost $1200.00. (Tr. 41 and Ex. 7) Another wit-
hess said $200.00. (Tr. 133) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING 
THAT "WATERPROOFING: ASPHALT EMUL-
SION" MEANS ONE COAT OF EMULSION TO BE 
SPRAYED OR PAINTED ON THE OUTSIDE OF 
rrHE \VALLS TO THE BASEMENT AND IN MAK-
lNG A ND Ji~NTERING A FINDING OF FACT, CON-
CLU8ION OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT THEREON. 
rrhe portion of the judgment appealed from hinges 
on the lower court's interpretation of the phrase in the 
specifications of the building contract between the par-
ties hereto found on page one of Def. Ex. 5, Description 
of Materials, xxx 2. Foundations: xxx Waterproofing: 
Asphalt Emulsion. The lower court modified this con-
tractual provision by reading into it: "One coat of 
emulsion to be sprayed or painted on the outside of the 
walls to the basement.'' The extent to which the lower 
court read these extra words into the specifications is 
aptly illustrated by the exchange between court and 
counsel on pages 166 and 167 of the transcript. -
In this exchange, the Trial Court readily agreed 
that he was reading the extra language into the Agree-
n1ent (Tr. 166, 167) 
'Phen, notwithstanding a determination by the Trial 
Court that the corrective work by Plaintiff had been 
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effective, the Court proceeded to apply a $1200.00 bid 
to excavate completely around the house, apply two 
coats of asphalt emulsion, backfilling, and repair of a 
patio (Exhibit 7) as a diminution of market value of the 
dwelling, there being no other evidence in the record of 
such change in market value. 
It is Plaintiff-Appellant's contention that in adding 
words to the written agreement and in fixing the dam--
ages in the manner set forth, that the Trial Court com-
mitted error. 
The Specifications, Exhibit 5, Description of Mater-
ials, merely called for "Waterproofing: asphalt emul-
sion.'' The lower court somehow adopted a fixed theory 
in its mind that this consists of coating the entire foun-
dation with an asphalt emulsion. The main question 
seems to be now, where did the lower court get this defi-
nition of the specification, and was the court justified in 
so adopting it ? 
This language certainly is ambiguous and does not 
in any way define itself. Accordingly, it would seem that 
evidence is admissible to determine what is meant by 
it. Defendant seemed to rely upon proof of custom in 
the trade; but in this respect, he had only one witness, 
a Mr. Steffenhagen who is a building contractor, and 
testimony concerning certain FHA specifications on 
buildings covering the area of dampproofing and water-
proofing. 
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To dispose of this last item first, it should be pointed 
out to this Honorable Court that this house was not an 
FHA house, nor was it built under FHA specifications. 
(Tr. 137) Second, the FHA specifications call for the 
application of one coat of bituminous dampproofing 
material to wall from footing to finish grade. (Tr. 156 
and 160) This alone is in conflict with the testimony 
given h:~ the other witness for the Defendant, whose 
testimony was that two coats should be applied. (See 
Exhibit 7, upon which the lower court based its arrival 
at the amount of damages) Most important is the bal-
ance of the FHA specification which provides that foun-
dation dampproofing may be omitted when acceptable 
to FHA field office in locations where well-drained soil 
exists or where ground or surface will not present a 
problem. (Tr. 128 and 160) The testimony in this re-
spect was that the soil in this area was dry and con-
tained no dampness; and that when this area was first 
developed as a subdivision, a hole was dug down for a 
septic tank test purpose in several areas to approxi-
mately 20 feet, and no water table was apparent. (Tr. 
121 and 160) Certainly, it would seem that the FHA 
specification is not controlling in any respect in this par-
ticular instance. 
As to proof of custom, the only witness for the De-
fendant was Mr. Steffenhagen who had been a general 
contractor for 12 years. He had built -0nly one or two 
s 
homes (Tr. 44) in this subdivision and testified that 
his building practice was to tar all of the surface of the 
foundation walls. An interesting sidelight here is that 
in rebuttal testimony, Plaintiff brought in proof that 
the very home which this witness had just completed 
in this area had not, in fact, been so tarred or coated 
with asphalt emulsion as the witness had testified he 
always did. (Tr. 143, 144, and 155) Thus, it is clear 
if the witness did have a practice of coating the entire 
surface of the foundation, he did not carry out this 
practice in the very area in which we are involved. 
Before going on to the law as to proof of custom, 
a word or two about the other evidence in this matter 
is pertinent. At the time of the trial, there were about 
47 new homes in this subdivision (Tr. 120) Of this num-
ber, the Plaintiff had built about one half of them (Tr. 
120); and the Plaintiff's witness, Mr. Jerry Greaves, 
Plaintiff's foreman, testified that he had supervised the 
construction on all of these homes. (Tr. 150) His test-
imony was certain and unequivocal that the best prac-
tice in the construction of homes in this area was to not 
coat the entire surface with an asphalt emulsion of a 
variety that could be applied with a paint brush, but 
that a thick asphalt emulsion should be placed over each 
of the places where a tie rod had gone through the f oun-
dation to hold the foundation forms in place. There is 
no doubt that this was done because the Defendant him-
self testified that when he made his own investigation. 
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he found a coating of this thick substance over each of 
the tie areas-the substance being about the size of a 
ba!:!eball at these points. Mr. Fuhriman, the President 
of the Plaintiff corporation, also testified that in his 
building experience this type of waterproofing was the 
best suited in this area. Both l\Ir. Fuhriman and Mr. 
(heaves testified they were aware of the method of us-
ing- a thin coat of asphalt emulsion to be painted over 
the eutire foundation, but they had not used this method 
for yean; and that they did not recommend this type 
of procedure and did not use it themselves because it 
'.'.'as not tlw best type of waterproofing and that their 
method as described above was the superior. 
Thfl specifications are silent on how much asphalt 
emulsion should be used and over what areas. The lower 
court in concluding that the entire foundation surface 
must Le coated with asphalt emulsion must have been 
reading into the contract a custom or usage, thus, rec-
ognizing the rnle which we are all aware of that usages 
anJ customs may and sometimes do affect contractual 
rights and liabilities even though they are not mentioned 
in the contract. However, we should review some of the 
basic and well-known requirements of the application of 
this important rule of law 
First, the mere existence of a custom or usage by 
itself is not sufficient to affect the parties's contractual 
rights. While the early view that the custom or usage 
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must be an ancient one before it will be recognized has 
gone by the wayside, it is still necessary that the custom 
or usage must have existed long enough to have become 
generally known and to justify the conclusion that the 
contract or transaction in question was made or done 
in reference to it. 
Second, also, the courts have been reluctant to rec-
ognize a custom or usage without accompanying evi-
dence that it is general in its operation. It must at least 
be shown to be so general and universal in character 
that knowledge of it by the parties to be charged may 
be presumed. 
Third, it must be certain, continuous, and uniform. 
Fourth, it must be uniformly acquiesced in by those 
whose rights would naturally be effected by it and must 
not have been the subject of dispute. 
Fifth, it must be reasonable. 
It is Plaintiff's position that the testimony of wit-
nesses engaged in the particular trade in question and 
familiar with its practices must be available to the 
court to establish such a custom. While we feel that one 
witness might be enough if his testimony were uncon-
troverted, we do not feel that the court can base a finding 
of custom on the testimony of one contractor when this 
testimony is controverted by the testimony of two con-
tractors who have constructed approximately 50 percent 
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of the homes in the area involved in the custom. It ap-
pears that items second, third, and fourth stated above 
are missing in Defendant's case. 
Turning to the law on the subject, reference is first 
made to American Jurisprudence where the discussion 
of Usages and Customs is found under said heading in 
\'olume fl5 at Page 263. 
Jn particular, the requisites and essential elements, 
emphasizing the points mentioned above, are discussed 
starting at Page 266 of 55 Am. Jur. 
Firnt of all, attention should be called to the fact 
that the Defendant has in no way pleaded a general 
custom or usage. His pleadings are silent on this point. 
Turning to the case law, there is a recent Idaho 
cas€' which discusses usages and customs in some detail. 
It is Commercial Insurance Company, a corporation, 
vs. Hartwell Excavating Company, Inc., a corporation, 
(Idaho, 1965) 407 Pacific 2d 312. 
At page 314 of this Reporter, the Idaho Supreme 
Court discusses the sufficiency of pleadings to set up a 
usage or custom in a matter. The court then goes on to 
discuss proof of usages and custom, citing and quoting 
from the American Jurisprudence provisions above re-
f erred to found at 55 Am. Jur., Usages and Customll. 
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The Idaho Court says ( 407 P2d 314) : 
"It is generally recognized that a custom or 
usage which may affect the rights of a party to 
a contract must be one that has existed for such 
length of time as to become generally known and 
practiced in the area in question or in ref ere nee 
to the particular trade or business with which it 
is connected. 55 Arn. Jur., Usages and Customs." 
''The foundation for the introduction of 
evidence of usage or custom is a showing of a ser-
ies of acts of a similar character performed at 
different times.'' 
and on page 317 of 407 P2d : 
''It is also recognized to be a general rule 
that when there is a known usage of a trade or 
business, persons carrying on that trade are 
deemed to have contracted in reference to the 
usage, unless the contrary appears.'' 
This case is the latest judicial pronouncement in this 
area on usages and customs that we have been able to 
find, and one of the few in this area on this point. 
Also, we note that in the new edition of American 
Jurisprudence, Am. Jur. 2d, the subject title has been 
reversed and is now covered under Customs and Usages, 
and the discussion is found in 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Customs 
and Usages, commencing at page 675 of said volume. 
In summary, we suggest again that the lower court 
in ruling that the specifications call for a one coat ap-
plication of asphalt emulsion over the entire foundation 
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of the Defendant's home, made its determination from 
somewhere other than the specifications. In our mind, 
it can only come from a mistaken belief that custom or 
usage so dictates; and we certainly strongly submit to 
this Court that the Defendant failed substantially to 
plead or make such proof of custom or usage. We submit 
that the evidence is .stronger to the effect that the proper 
way and cnstomary way to waterproof in the area invol-
ved i.'3 by placing the thicker type substance over the 
areas where the ties penetrate throught the concrete 
foundatjon, in other words, the critical areas. 
In conclusion, on the point of alleged breach of con-
tract, there is no doubt as to the exact language of the 
specification - ''Waterproofing: asphalt emulsion.'' 
Nothing is said, however, about where applied, how ap-
plied, or in what thicknes.s. This specification is obvious-
ly not a warranty that the home will be waterproof or, 
as defendant seems to claim, watertight. Waterproof is 
not construed to mean "watertight." See Words and 
Phrases, Vol. 44, page 723. There cited is the case of 
Waters vs. Yockey, (Texas) 193 S. W. (2d) 575, 576, 
where the holding is: 
•' rrl1e word waterproof is a relative expression 
and doe.s not mean that water is to be kept out of 
the basement under all conditions . . . '' 
In the instant case, the specifications call for asphalt 
emulsion. This was applied in the manner called for 
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under the best judgment of the contractor and foreman 
based on years of experience in the area. And for the 
defendant to say that the fact that water came into the 
basement is ipso facto a breach of contract is not correct. 
The water came in; the cau.se was remedied, effectively 
said the lower court. What more can or need be done? 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FIXING DAMAGES 
AT $1200.00, EVEN ASSUMING A BREACH OF 
CONTRACT. 
Assuming for argument a breach of contract on the 
part of Plaintiff, it remains clear that the court below 
erroneously assessed damages to be $1200.00. 
Defendant's witness, Steffenhagen, testified that 
it would cost $1200.00 to excavate completely around 
the house, apply tico coats of asphalt emulsion, backfill, 
and repair the patio. (Tr. 41 and Exhibit 7) 
The Trial Court adopted thi.s as the amount of di-
minution in market value of the dwelling, notwithstand-
ing a finding that there was no evidence of diminution 
of market value. (:Memorandum Decision, R. 11) 
While we agree that cost of repairs may be the 
measure of damages, it "vould seem that the costs of re-
pairs would be limited to those repairs necessary to 
restore the building to its prior condition, here, to a con-
dition where it did not seep water, 22 Am. Jur. (2d) 
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Damages, Rection 140, Page 204, not the costs of re-
pair far in excess of the need to repair !l!Omething 
that does not need repair. Here, the lower court deter-
mined the repair work done by plaintiff was effective. 
Here, there is obviously no need to excavate completely 
around the house, tear up a patio, and apply two coats 
of asphalt emulsion. It is strongly urged that there has 
l)een a substantial over-play of remedy here, even as-
suming a breach. In any event, the cost of repair would 
not exceed $200.00. 
And in passing, we suggest that the lower court 
also afforded the defendant a gratuity in awarding him 
a judgment for $100.00 on the flaw in the floor covering. 
By their own testimony, the Jarrells admitted they were 
cutting corners and skimping in order to get more items 
for their money than the contract entitled them to. (Tr. 
1 I;->) 
The credible testimony of the merchant was that 
the Jarrells purchased an as-is end role, without war-
ranty; and, actually, plaintiff had nothing to do with 
either the selection or installation of the linoleum. Nev-
ertheless, the Court below charged plaintiff with $100.00, 
we think, in error. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant discovered the leak m the basement 
shortly after moving into the home on April 5, 1965. 
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(Tr. 61) Yet, on May 12, 1965, Defendant sent Plaintiff 
a final payment on the home by a check (PL. Ex. 1) for 
$3,920.10, marked, ''In full payment of my home at 
1675 East 14th North, Logan, Utah." Plaintiff accepted 
this as tendered. This seemed to settle the matter of 
the new home, and it was not actually until the day of 
the trial in City Court on the issue of rent on the rental 
home that Defendant raised the issue of breach of con-
tract. This was on October 5, 1965. (R. 5) Plaintiff re-
spectively submits that it performed the contract invol-
ved in a proper manner, remedied the Defendant's com-
plaint when advised of it, and was paid in due course of 
time. It should not now be called upon to respond in 
unfair and exorbitant damages where none exist. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
By~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Charles P. Olson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
56 West Center 
Logan, Utah 
